A People Without Social Relations is a People Without Property: Property, Relationality, and Social Networks in the Formation of Political Rights by Somers, Margaret R.
TRANSFORMATIONS 
comparative study of social transformations 
CSST 
WORKING PAPERS 
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor 
"A People Without Social Relations is a 
People Without Property: Property, 
Relationality, and Social Networks in 
the Formation of Political Rights 




Paper #49 6 
--.,<.. A PEOPLE WITHOUT SOCIAL RELATIONS .IS A PEOPLE WITHOUT 
PROPERTY: 
Property, Relationa1ity;and Social Networks in the Formation of Political 
Rights '3 
Margaret R. Somers 
Department of Sociology 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
3 13-995-0779 
Bitnet: userGD52@umichum or Internet: MSomers@um.cc.umich.edu 
Forthcoming in Susan Staves and John Brewer, eds., Early ~ d d e r n  
Conceptions of Property, London: Routledge, 1992. 
- .  . - 
*An earlier version of this paper was first presented in 1989 at the UCLA 
Clark Library symposium, "Conceptions of Property," sponsored by the Center for 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Studies. I a m  grateful to members of the 
seminar for their engaged responses to the paper. In addition I would like to 
thank John Brewer, Gloria Gibson, Rick Lempert, Susan Staves, Marc Steinberg, 
and Lawrence Stone for their comments on a previous version of this paper. The 
research was carried out in part under the auspices of a 1989-90 fellowship at the 
Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University. I thank 
Lawrence Stone for making that  support possible. My title' is a paraphrase of a 
quote from Jack Goody, Death, Property, and the Ancestors (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1962): "A man without social relations is a man 
without property" (p. 287). 
A PEOPLE WITHOUT SOCIAL RELATIONS 
IS A PEOPLE WITHOUT PROPERTY: 
Property, Relationality, and Social Networks in the 
Formation of Political Rights 
Property has long held a foundational place in political theories of rights. 
The idea that the private and autonomous sphere of property offers rights and 
protections against the omnipresent potential tyranny of the public state can 
readily be traced back to Locke's treatises on property, labor, and rights in which 
he argues the sole purpose for which government exists is to protect and secure its 
subjects pr0perty.l Most crucially, he insists that the right to this property-- 
which he defines as "lives, liberties and estatesw--is a natural right rather than an 
arbitrary one contingent on the will of a ruler (11, p.368). For Locke what makes 
these property rights natural is their rootedness in the deeply private sphere of 
human labor, more specifically by "mixing our labour" with God's common ground 
(11, p.308).2 A different Republican strand of influence reaches back to 
Machiavelli's celebration of small agricultural property as the source of political 
virtue and liberty.3 Only the capacity for self-support which such property 
provides can secure for people the material conditions for independent political 
participation, that is, political rights beyond the influence of corruption. The 
absence of such property conduces to dependence as the propertyless are 
vulnerable to corruption by the rich--the bloated property owners who will 
inevitably use money to politically influence weaker citizens (pp. 102-4). Again, 
the privacy of ownership is assumed to found the rights to public liberty. 
Finally, yet another influential variant on property and rights can be found 
in ~ a r x . ~  Marx begins from the presupposition that freedom is rooted in the 
autonomous human capacity for free labor; inexorably this points to waged-labor 
capitalist control over the means and ends of production as the source of 
unfreedom. Capitalism's exponential dependence on the creation of surplus value 
demands (beyond the will of individual capitalists) a comparable continual increase 
in the exploitation and alienation of human labor. Combined with the labor theo- 
ry of value, discussed by Ian Shapiro in the first essay in this volume, a powerful 
claim emerges in ~ a r x  for political freedom to lie in the expropriation of capitalist 
property a t  the point of production. 
Strikingly, these ideologically dissimilar theories clearly converge on a single 
epistemological premise: politi'cal rights and freedoms are the historically 
contingent effect; changing property relations are the foundational natural object 
and the cause of rights5 In natural rights theories (of both the right and the left), 
civil liberties emerge as a right grounded in the property created by autonomous 
labor, as Shapiro has said. For republicanism, rights are offered only to those who 
have the propertied foundation for independence, and in Marx, both unfreedom 
and emancipation are rooted in the original division between labor power and 
private property in the means of production. In modern sociological theories the 
trend continues6 T. H. Marshall's classic study of citizenship, for example, 
documents the growth of citizenship as a product of the developmental logic of 
private property and its social ~ o n s e ~ u e n c e s . ~  He argues that the needs of the 
seventeenth-century landed gentry for waged labor on the land and bourgeois 
demands for mobile property set the motor in gear for the movement toward civil 
rights. Subsequent contradictions between property relations and the exclusions 
and inequalities of class kept the engine going. Political citizenship was a product 
of the nineteenth-century ascendancy of the middle class, while social citizenship 
came in the twentieth century with the power of the working class. 
This approach to property has a long pedigree. It can be found a t  the heart 
of the social naturalism of the private sphere from which the growth of the social 
sciences can be traced.8 In eighteenth-century England, for instance, we find 
William Townsend, a statesman and policy-maker, propounding an apocryphal 
allegory about a desert island "society" of "goats" and "dogs" comprised of only 
two "racesw--property owners and laborers--who lived in perfect harmony with 
each other.9 Counter to prevailing political wisdom, however, this naturalistic 
social utopia would thrive as a self-regulating (private) economy precisely because 
of the &sen= of public state interference into the productive sphere. Deprived of 
poor relief (public welfare) the propertyless would be paturallv--that is, 
harmoniously--driven to labor. Dubbed the "theorem of the goats and dogs," the 
allegory was widely popularized in the (successful) cause of exhortation to repeal 
the Elizabethan Poor Laws. Following Locke, however, Townsend does find one 
purpose for government on his island. Historically-constructed public laws would 
be needed to protect the propertied from theft by the propertyless. 
In Townsend, then, and later in Malthus and Ricardo on whom he was a 
direct influence, the relationship of property and the private sphere was net only 
f0undationa.l and autonomous, but natural and, metaphorically, biological--in the 
sense that the classes are so different by nature that the differences among them 
are like differences among species. And while its crudity has been long surpassed, 
the fable still highlights the conceptual link between property and political rights. 
Against the inexorable force of natural law, political forms can be posed as social 
constructions which will either interfere with the harmony of nature (e.g.the Poor 
Laws) or which are a necessary complement of that same natural force (e.g.laws to 
protect property). 10 
Two historical periods in particular have played center stage in the story of 
property's foundational place in liberty and rights-formation. Locke's seventeenth 
century is of course the first when the landed gentry used their claims to the 
natural rights of property to demand inclusion in the polity and, when that was 
consistently denied, to seize power and later to settle on a constitutional 
monarchy. The second historical period is the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, marked first by the combined struggle of the working and middle classes 
for the vote--culminating in the limited 1832 Reform Bill-- and subsequently by 
the massive growth and ultimate defeat of Chartism. This article will focus on 
these nineteenth-century Chartist claims to political rights and present a counter- 
foundational approach to the relationship between property and rights. Against 
the mainstream, I will argue that the private sphere of property--whether in land 
or in labor--was not perceived to be the precondition for political rights and thus 
the ultimate protection against public tyranny. By contrast, I will argue that the 
public realm of social relations and membership was the precondition for what the 
Chartists and other working people's defined as property in the first place. Part I 
will address prevailing and recent arguments concerning Chartism and property; 
Part I1 will present my alternative conception of the Chartist's political culture of 
property; and Parts 111-V will explore the historical meaning of that culture in the 
lives of the Chartists7 early modern urban and proto-industrial ancestors. 
The underlying method of analysis is one which replaces ideas of class 
formation and interest with that of narrative identity. l l This reflects my effort to 
find a concept capacious and historically sensitive enough to capture the 
connectivity of social action. Identities are not formed by interests imputed from a 
stage of social development (be it pre-industrial or modern), or by "experience" 
imputed from a social category (such as traditional artisan, factory laborer, or 
working-class wife), but by a person's "place" in a relational setting comprised of 
(breakable) rules, (variable) practices and discourses, binding (and unbinding) 
institutions. This setting must be conceived as a network of temporal and spatial 
relationships. The concept of narrative identity, therefore, makes action not an 
event but an episode--one that is shaped by both memory and anticipation. This 
makes identities both malleable and contested, but nonetheless only intelligible 
through the narratives of their past. Narrativity also eliminates the notion that 
certain actions are rational while others are irrational or "backwards-looking"; the 
relationships which give meaning, contingency, and historicity to identity have no 
teleology. Thus the development of identity must be explored over the long term, 
and the problem of understanding the political meaning of property reposed as a 
problem of discovering the complexities of narrative identities and political 
cultures 
I. CHARTISM AND RIGHTS-CLAIMS: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY IN 
LABOR? 
The Chartist movement of the second qu.arter of the nineteenth century 
bears particular significance for political theory. I t  is well-known that in the face 
of the 1832 Reform Bill which extended the franchise to the propertied middle- 
classes, working people lost little time in building Chartism, the first and largest 
autonomous working-class suffrage movement (roughly 1836- 1848). Because this 
autonomous movement of propertyless working people went down to defeat 
against Parliament, now widely enlarged by the newly enfranchised middle 
classes, the conclusions to be drawn regarding property and rights have long 
confirmed the foundational approach. As an historical exemplar, however, one 
aspect of the Chartist period remains for historians and theorists especially 
intriguing. Although no longer allied with the propertied middle classes, this 
working-class movement continued to justify its claims to suffrage rights on the 
basis of gropertv--even though, in our current sense of the word, the majority 
were, of course, propertyless. Until recently there has been one predominant 
interpretation of this conundrum: the claim to rights was grounded on the 
assumption that working people were not propertyless, but possessed gropertv in 
$heir labor, and thus held equal.claim to rights as those who held property in land 
or capital. 
The Chartists who made this claim were part of a small group of "Ricardian 
Socialists," embracing a kind of proto-marxism focussing squarely on the 
conflictual relationship between labor and capital. ,Developed in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, these radicalized versions of the labor theory of 
value were most clearly expressed in the writings of J. F. Bray, William 
Thompson, John Gray, and Thomas Hodgskin. The "people's science," as it was 
called, turned Ricardo on his head by appropriating the concept that labor was the 
source of all value as a reason for workers to be entitled to rights rather than 
exposed to a commodified labor market.12 Following the Marxist variant, some 
historians have since used these writings to prove that the Chartist movement was 
in fact a class conscious movement which demonstrated an explicit comprehension 
that the suffering of working people derived from the point of production and the 
alienation of their property in labor. 
Although this Marxist view had long been challenged by Weberian and neo- 
Durkeimian perspectives, more recently Gareth Stedman Jones has presented a 
persuasive and highly influential alternative interpretation of these nineteenth- 
century working-class claims.13 It  is one that reads a radical Lockeanism into the 
popular link between property and rights. Drawing from a revisionist approach to 
Locke in political theory,14 Stedman Jones was the first to argue that this radical 
Lockeanism could be applied to the Chartist period. His main argument was with 
the long prevalent "social" analyses of Chartism which essentially imputed a 
socioeconomic causality and meaning to the explicitly political language of the 
Charter. Using what he defined as a political and linguistic approach to Chartism, 
he argued that people actually meant what they said. That is, when working 
people said that the solution to their distress was political--i.e. in winning the vote- 
-it was because the discursive tradition of radical Lockeanism defined social 
distress as a political problem, namely in the monopoly of political power held by 
the ruling political classes, rather than a problem founded in the production 
process or the alienation of labor. In the words of Chartist 07Brien: 
Knaves will tell you that it is because you have no property, you are 
unrepresented. I tell you on the contrary, i t  is because you are 
unrepresented that you have no property ...yg ur poverty is the result 
not the cause of your being unrepresented. 
Stedman Jones takes us back to the eighteenth-century "Country Partyw--an 
important tradition of disaffected small-holding Tories who challenged the great 
propertied Whig "Court Party" for the corrupting effects of their political 
monopoly and those gentry practices of exclusion Tories associated with the 
settlements of 1688 and 17 14. l6 In the 1790s, a t  the beginning of the Reform 
Movement, this quasi-populist tradition was transmuted into a plebeian 
phenomenon; it provided a popular political analysis for ruling class corruption and 
a constitution-focussed solution centering on the demand for more inclusive 
political representation.17 Although most historians had argued that with 
political repression and industrialization, radicalism had faded and transformed by 
the 1830s into the beginnings of a truer class consciousness, Stedman Jones argues 
instead that the Chartist platform and mass appeal can only be explained by the 
robust continuity of radicalism and its political critique well into the 1840s. 
Indeed, the rise and fall of Chartism, according to Stedman Jones, can be made 
much more intelligible by tracking the actual behavior of the English state. After 
all, if the concentration of Parliamentary power and and its legislative 
consequences were the source of popular distress, it was only logical that the 
political appeal of radicalism would no longer resonate in the face of actual 
legislative reform such as the 1847 Factory Legislation, a bill which, although 
limited, finally met working class demands for a ten hour limit on the working day 
for women and children. 
That it was their property in labor which provided working people with the 
natural right to political representation is, of course, the Lockean element in this 
tradition of radicalism. Indeed, a "reasonable" reading of Locke suggests that "as 
St Paul and Lenin agreed, the man who did not work had no right to eat," it is 
Q& working people who have such a natural right.18 It was precisely such a 
reading of Locke, channeled through Paine and Cobbett, to which the Chartists 
held, according to Stedman Jones, citing their belief that the poverty of the 
working classes was the result of a process of "legal robbery, made possible by the 
monopoly of law-making" by aristocratic robbers, "parasites" and "idlers" who 
lived off of wealth that was in truth that of workers themselves. Through political 
corruption these idlers "reaped" the rewards of workers' labor. Despite being 
viewed as a threat to the propertied by the propertyless, the Chartists "did not 
regard the working classes as propertyless. For since the only legitimate source of 
property was labor, laborers were in possession of the most fundamental form of 
all property" (pp. 108-9). The solution, then, to this problem would not be one 
aimed a t  expropriating the means of production. On the contrary, it would be one, 
that focussed on transforming through universal manhood suffrage a corrupt and 
unfairly exclusive political system in which "all other forms of property were 
afforded political and legal support, while that of labor was left a t  the mercy of 
those who monopolized the state and the law. 019 
In this reading of Chartism, Stedman Jones launched a significant critique 
of the socio-centrism which had been characteristic of political analysis in 
nineteenth-century social history. It is one which gives the workers back their 
own words and their own lives. For all the strengths and contributions of his 
revisionism, however, in its fundamentals his reading is still firmly grounded in a 
familiar epistemological tradition; that in which property as a foundational natural 
object assumes the role of a private buttress against public tyranny by 
legitimating political rights.20 If his reading of political monopoly, for example, is 
correct, it is still only the proximate cause of distress; the ultimate source of 
political monopoly would have to be in the distinction contemporaries made 
between landed and other sorts of property. According to the power-holders only 
fee. simple landed and real propertv guaranteed political rights, while the Chartists 
contested with the equally foundational claim that since labor is the natural source 
of all property, nature demands that laborers should be included in Parliament. 
Stedman Jones still attributes the political meaning of Chartist claims to their 
possession of property in labor. 
11. CHARTISM AND RIGHTS-CLAIMS: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY IN 
MEMBERSHIP 
.. . In this article I want to turn these epistemological premises on their head. 
All of the variants of the foundational approaches above presuppose that the 
autonomy of property and the private sphere constitutes the buttress of public 
freedom. Put another way, they all assume that a people without autonomous 
property is a people without political rights. I will argue the converse: for the 
Chartists--indeed for nineteenth-century working people in general-+ people 
without social relationality and public membership was a people without 
property.21 Thus while they indeed relied on property in labor as the basis for 
their claims to the right of political participation, these nineteenth-century 
working people nonetheless clearly articulated that their very conception of 
he preco grosertv was itself founded on t nditions and practices of sociallv 
constructed rights and obligations of public membership, social networks, and 
institutional association, In this epistemological inversion, the property supporting 
public rights was not the property of autonomous private labor, but the property 
of membership. In this we can also read an inverted understanding of the 
relationship between property and personality. The social identity of freedom and 
independence was only proximately derived from the autonomy of property. More 
fundamentally, it was derived from the rights and obligations of membership on 
which property itself was founded. 
This reading of Chartist claims suggests a very different conception of the 
terms "property", "labor", "rights", "freedom" and "liberty", and, above all, of 
that which most embodied their definition of property, namely that of "skilled" 
and "fair" labor. Skill was articulated as a property by factory workers and 
artisans alike. But in the social and narrative identities of these working people, 
skill was only marginally a technical practice--indeed through various extra- 
relational methods many "unskilled" and "dishonorable" workers had obtained 
technical ability. More fundamentally, skill referred only to those whose work was 
rightfully exercised within the bonds and bounds of the strict practices of 
membership. In practical terms, this meant that a person was skilled only if he or 
she had served a (formal or informal) apprenticeship; apprenticeship was the 
process by which the line was demarcated between inclusion and exclusion of 
membership.22 People were included in the freedoms and rights of the skilled 
co'mmunity only if they operated within the largely unwritten but well-understood 
rules and practices of their trade and only, if they maintained the "misteries" of 
their labor  association^.^^ 
The property of skill was thus a relational practice rather than an 
individual attribute. Not the capacity to work a trade but the right to  do so was 
endowed by virtue of membership in a skilled community. To ground these 
abstract arguments about property, labor, and rights, I will briefly revisit the 
social practices of the Chartists and other contemporary movements. In doing so 
it should become clear that the right to participate politically (universal suffrage) 
a t  both the national and local level was only one of a bundle of liberties that the 
0 
property of skilled labor was understood to guarantee--others included the 
substantive regulation of markets in prices, wages, and commodities, and a 
necessary link between these freedoms and the cohesion of families and 
communities. Rather than a "moral economy," however, this bundle of rights tied 
up with property as membership signified a commitment to a form of regulative 
liberty as a form of citizenship. For like citizenship, this was a conception of 
property tied to rights and liberties which were not free floating and natural rights 
but which were rights connected only with a particular membership in a particular 
polity of relationships, rules, and obligations. 24 
During the Chartist era English working people marched peacefully to 
Parliament and they mobbed unpopular workhouses; they petitioned to retain or 
reinstitute apprenticeship and wage regulations and they demanded new forms of 
state intervention into the length of the working day; they tenaciously fought for 
the right to outdoor poor relief and for local control over its administration and 
they waged militant strikes; they formed self-help and community based 
educational organizations and families "huddled" and exercised political influence 
by boycotting selected merchants; throughout, they linked these practices to the 
demand for participation in Parliament through universal manhood suffrage.25 
Through all these social practices one central narrative ran like a thick thread. 
Quite simply, this narrative theme was that working people had inviolable 
to a particular political and legal relationship between $he people and $he law. 
They claimed these rights through a particular understanding of the law, a 
particular understanding of the people and their membership in the political 
community, and a particular conception about the rightful relationship between 
the people and the law. This conception of rights defined independence and 
autonomy as inexorably linked to the property rights of working people, but only 
minimally to the fruits of individual labor. They rested primarily on membership 
in the political community. Let us first look briefly a t  each of the two components, 
the people and the law, to better understand how they fit together as a single 
animating principle. 
The claims put to the law were composed of three interlocking languages of 
legal and political rights: one of civil, one of participatory, and the third of 
substantive and regulative rights. The claim to participatory rights is the one 
with which we are most familiar. It was salient first in the Reform movement of 
the 1820s and then in Chartism during the 1830s and 1840s. In their claims for 
participatory rights, as Stedman Jones has argued, the Chartists ascribed blame 
for the social inequities and poverty of the working classes to the political 
"arrangements" of "that house" (Parliament), arrangements which excluded 
working peoples. The second language was that of substantive justice and the 
claim to regulative law. It was expressed through the consistent demand for the 
right, the obligation, and the necessity of laws to regulate markets, whether in 
labor, commodities, machinery, or currency. These two discourses were joined 
together by a third, the language of civil rights and independence which assumed 
that freedom and access to law were rights of all freeborn English people.26 But 
the critical conjoining thread among the three was the understanding that because 
laws and rules were the infrastructural elements of the social world, then 
gartici~atorv and substantive legal rights were the pre-conditions of independence 
and freedom.27 This meant that participatory rights were unequivocally 
understood to be linked to regulative and redistributive issues; that substantive 
laws were appealed to not by a deferent lower class seeking paternalism or 
protection, but in the name of liberty and independence; and--as perhaps the 
strongest indicator--that the Chartists insisted that regulative laws were not to be 
administered from central state inspection committees. Without exception, each 
demand to the state for regulation was complemented by the insistence on local 
control over the process of implementation. The anti-Poor Law movement, for 
example, railed equally against administrative centralization as against the 
dreaded workhouse, just as the factory movement demanded a local inspectorate 
against the Chadwick7s Benthamite scheme for c e n t r a l i z a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
But just who were "the people"?29 Like the concept of law, the idea of the 
people had three dimensions: 1) the "people" were freeborn and independent; 2) 
the "people" were a democratically-conceived group of equal participants; and 3) 
the "people" were a solidaristic self-regulated community. Incorporating the 
Lockean notion that free people have a natural right to the independence provided 
them by their own labor, the first implied that the "people" were all of those who 
worked a trade honestly, who were not idlers (parasites, placemen, capitalists, and 
aristocrats), and those who had the right to be independent in the "true" sense of 
the word, that is, on the basis of property rightfully held in labor.30 Co-existing 
with this radical Lockeanism, however, was an insistence that membership rules 
were the kev to self-rule. This was a conceptior, of the people based neither on the 
capacity to work, nor on ownership of property in labor, but on actual engagement 
in "honest labor," skilled labor, and co-operative labor. The people, in this 
conception, were those who worked accord in^ to membership rules. The 
property of labor in this language was not conceived of as an individual attribute 
but as one consequent on self-regulation among the people. Indeed, the very 
property that gave people the right to be skilled was the property of a formal or 
informal apprenticeship. Colluders with a competitive and free labor market were 
excluded.32 Finally, within this conception of membership and independence, a 
third language understood the people as those who were equal democratic 
participants in the practices of self-rule. As Clive Behagg has convincingly 
documented, an "active form of popular democracy" operated within workshops 
and trade societies; it found expression in, among other things, trade courts and 
continually rotating participation in trade re~ponsibil i t ies.~~ 
What joined together these three conceptions of the people was that they all 
defined "the people" in relational and exclusionary terms. Social and narrative 
identities were not derived from roles in production, or in terms of their class 
"interests", but from social and political relationships. The line between the people 
and the oppressors was thus not a strictly horizontal one but a circular one which 
circumscribed those who had a fictitious independence, whether it was the despised 
independence of wealth gained from depriving working people of their true 
property in labor or the fraudulent independence of those who broke the rules of 
co-operation. Just as the condition of the people was explained in part by political 
exclusion, the basis of exclusion was in turn explained as the deprivation of the 
people of their rightful property in honorable labor, itself defined, in turn, in 
exclusionary terms. The vocabulary of exclusion was inseparable from the self- 
identity of workers as independent property owners in their relational rules of 
association. 
This characterization does not prioritize either a language of class or one of 
politics. There is no question that a language of class developed from the 1830s 
on, just as there is no question but that same language identified the state as 
controlling the levers of social power.34 But most significant is that the language 
of rights embraced both politics and class; it was the explanatory prism through 
which class issues and other aspects of social distress were mediated and made 
sense. Rights-claims were thus political in the broadest sense--they established the 
claim to empowerment deriving not only from constitutional and "natural" rights, 
but from community cohesion and autonomy in membership. Because they 
conjoined artisanal conceptions of property-based citizenship rights, these rights- 
claims also conjoined our usually separate notions of social and political rights. 
Rights-bearing identities included class rights as one part of a bundle of rights 
attached to political membership under law; they combined social power, politics, 
individual rights, and membership.35 
Thus the prevailing public narrative of the Chartists, and the plot-line by 
which it was configured, was that of a political culture of rightsL36 The history 
and projected future of this rights culture was the theme through which events 
were evaluated, explained, and given meaning.37 The political culture of English 
working people was based upon political rights, obligations, and rules--rules of law 
and rules among the people:-not upon a conception of their place or function-in the 
sphere of production. I am not asserting that this political culture had nothing to 
do with Locke. Rather I want to show how radical Lockeanism was over- 
determined by a far more deeply institutionalized and highly adaptable set of 
practices which long preceded Locke and which endured in protean form well into 
the twentieth-century. Let us now ,explore the narrative identities and relational 
settings of the Chartists' a n c e s t ~ s .  
111. RURAL-INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE CHARTISTS ANCESTRY 
The recent body of literature on proto-industrialization would seem to have 
especially far-reaching importance for understanding nineteenth-century working- 
class identities since we now know that it was from these regions of rural- 
industrial concentration that the "industrial revolution" and its working peoples 
emerged. Although the existence and continual growth of English domestic 
industry in the countryside from as early as the thirteenth century has long been 
recognized, the renamed concept of "proto-industrialization" or "industrialization 
before industrialization" has now moved rural-industry to center stage in the 
analysis of Western European industrialization. The new model, most notably 
associated with Franklin Mendels, Rudolph Braun, Hans Medick, Peter Kriedte, 
et.al., and Chuck Tilly, has large aims (in its more clearly Marxist version, it 
purports to be no less than the most recent contribution to the extended debate 
over the transition from feudalism to capitalism), and has had wide influence in 
revising ideas of economic and social development.38 Not surprisingly it has 
generated a small academic revolution in its theoretical challenge to the 
conventional causal arguments and periodization of European development.39 No 
one who speaks of textile work in the rural areas of Western Europe before the 
nineteenth century can refer to this mode of production in the quaint old terms of 
the "putting-out industry", "cottage industry", or the "domestic system" without 
either adopting or explicitly rejecting the new term.l0 And since we now know 
that the industrial villages of the early nineteenth-century sprouted from the 
labors and lands of proto-industrial families, we can now ask: to what extent can 
the narrative identities of the Chartists now be understood as a product of an 
earlier period of proletarianization and propertylessness? 
The model's central claim is that industrialization was ultimately successful 
thanks to the proletarianization of pre-nineteenth-century rural-industrial families. 
These putting-out working families are said to have comprised the first "modern" 
labor market, that is, they were subjected to a free and unregulated labor market 
which operated not according to "traditional" institutional restraints of family, 
feudalism, and guild, but according to the logic of the new non-institutional self- 
regulating economic mechanism of supply and demand. The exposure to a waged- 
labor market posed new and great dangers to rural-industrial, previously peasant, 
families. Harvest failures, the volatile international market, the wage-price 
scissors crunch, and dependence upon middlemen and merchant capitalists all 
threatened to corrode community and family life and to undermine any security in 
livelihood. 
The proto-industrial theory depends upon three propositions about the lives 
and livelihoods of the ancestors of nineteenth-century industrial working people. 
First, the core of most explanations for the development of rural industry is that it 
was the absence of skilled labor practices (or the presence of what economists call 
the "elasticity of labor") that attracted merchants in the first place to areas 
outside the regulative reach of urban guilds and skilled workers. Second, proto- 
industrial theorists have readily followed Adam Smith's lead in assuming that 
little if any technical skill was necessary for the weaving and spinning of textiles. 
Since textile work did not require technical skill, employers hired unskilled women 
and children whose cheap labor, he argued, was one of the reasons for the 
economic success of rural-industrial textile production. And third, rural-industrial 
workers were completely without self-defensive organizational resources. Analysts 
following the Webbs' History of Trade Unionism have rejected any possible links 
between guilds, rural labor disputes, and nineteenth-century industrial trade 
unions; they label earlier appearances of labor conflict "primitive" and 
"ephemeral," hcking the continuity that fortifies organization.41 Accordingly, 
they do not discern the economic preconditions for true organization until the 
industrial revolution. 
Yet English evidence from the countryside challenges the proto-industrial 
theory. This evidence points to notable labor market power, restrictive practices, 
the highest European rural-industrial wages, and an extraordinary capacity to use 
the law to the advantage of working peoples.42 In England's textile communities 
(in contrast to agricultural regions) this evidence suggests that clothworkers were 
not defenseless to a free labor market or the perils of self-exploitation. There is 
also considerable evidence to suggest that in English textile communities (this time 
in contrast to rural-industrial workers in Continental regions) clothworkers 
displayed a striking capacity for regulative intervention into the labor market and 
an impressive--although, to be sure, not invincible--capacity to counter the threats 
of a free labor market. Although outside of the regulated urban guilds, it appears 
they nonetheless were able to restrict entry to their trade by regulating the 
acquisition of skills necessary to work in textile production. Although without 
formal organization, they were able to prevent fellow workers from accepting 
"unfair" wages. Although without representatives, they often seized the 
advantage over employers by demanding higher wages and restricting labor supply 
in times of labor demand. And although without unions, they were able to provide 
social security relief for each other in order to prevent the drive of hunger from 
forcing fellow workers to accept low wages during trade slumps.43 In fact, rather 
than wage labor signalling the triumph of an unregulated labor market, powerful 
regulative practices appear to have been a major force in shaping the nature of 
English rural-industrial labor relations. Through restrictive and regulative 
practices, rural-industrial artisans exercised a competing and countervailing set of 
rules over and against the "rules" of the free labor market--the supply-demand- 
wage-price mechanism--of the merchant capitalist employers. 
Restrictive labor practices, community empowerment, occupational 
monopolies, and organized rules among the rural industrial labor force? Surely 
such practices are those we associate with skilled artisanal workers. How are we 
to explain such a pattern among a "propertyless" and fully "proletarianized" 
community? One answer points to the empirical limitations of the theory. For 
example, the exclusive utilization of unskilled women and children by rural- 
industrial employers was not nearly as universal as either Adam Smith or the 
theorists of proto-industrialization have suggested. David Levine writes that 
rural-industry was "dependent upon the artisanal mode in which the arduously 
accumulated skills of the craftsman, not the authority of the employer, were the 
pre-eminent determinants of the method and pace of work." Successful production 
was therefore not built upon technological complexity and fixed capital, but rather 
on the "craftsman's experience, intellect, skill, diligence and training." This 
presents a picture of an independent worker who forced employers to accept the 
"high cost of craftsmen" in the production process. These judgments are supported 
by Sidney Pollard's findings that rural-industry developed successfully primarily in 
those regions notable for the local build-up of skills. Buchanan Sharp, referring to 
the seventeenth-century, also rejects the idea that textile work was by- 
employment, insisting instead on the "artisanal status" of rural cloth worker^.^^ 
But this addresses only one aspect of the problem. The attempt to fully 
understand the regulative capacities of rural-industrial peoples takes us to the 
serious limitations of the proto-industrial model, especially its theoretical and 
methodological premises.45 For all of the breadth of its argument and analytic 
power, the entire causal sequence of explanation hinges upon the single lynch pin 
- of the "free" and totally unregulated character of the rural-industrial labor 
= - market. This, however, is an example of what Karl Polanyi has called "the 
economistic fallacy," namely, the assumption that economic relations are prior to 
and hence analytically discrete from institutional and social relationships. 46 . 
Economic sociology can provide an important alternative framework for analyzing - 
rural-industrial labor markets. The approach involves analyzing labor relations 
not through abstract "economic" functions, but as "an instituted process" of 
interactive rules and cultural, rather than abstract, relations. In economic 
sociology we do not ask whether markets exist within institutional boundaries, but 
instead, of what nature are the institutional and cultural frameworks of the 
market and what are the different effects of these frameworks in actual historical 
practice? Economic sociology assumes that all labor relations are structured 
through contested rules of authority, and rights and obligations in regard to the 
productive use of persons and things.47 The challenge is to understand 
empirically the impact of those rules, rights, and obligations. Only this will help 
us to understand the lives of the rural-industrial predecessors to those nineteenth- 
century workers who comprised the ranks of the Chartists. 
When rural-industrial workers are described as a defenseless proletarianized 
labor force, it is against the base-line of the regulated urban guilds that they are 
being compared. Theorists of proto-industrialization argue that it was precisely 
because urban artisanal guild workers were able to control and restrict labor 
relations that merchant capitalists sought out and created a free labor market 
from impoverished families outside the guilds in the rural countryside. But the 
importance of understanding more fully the dynamics of this putatively defenseless 
rural labor market directs us to take a closer and comparative look at  the 
regulative power of the guilds. In doing so, we will discover that it was neither 
the urban locale nor the division of labor that gave guild workers their bargaining 
power. Rather, they had bargaining power because of three institutional and 
cultural foundations on which their regulative practices were based: 1) the law-- 
guild law, urban and mercantile law, and state law; 2) participation in local 
governance; and 3) the capacity to enforce strict self-discipline and cooperation 
among guild members themselves--again a power rooted not in the artisanal 
division of labor but in the nature of the social relations among artisanal workers 
t h e m ~ e l v e s . ~ ~  I will first explore these institutional surroundings in which urban 
labor markets were embedded in order to contrast them to those of the rural- 
industrial countryside. After so doing, I will make the strong and controversial 
case that English rural-industrial communities were the only ones among 
European countries that had functionally similar institutional  foundation^,^^ and 
thus that alone among European rural-industrial families: English clothworkers 
bad the capacitv to maintain a significant degree of regulative power over their 
labor markets, It was this unique capacity which goes a far way to explain the 
nature of the political claims and expectations later expressed by their Chartist 
progeny. 
IV. URBAN ROOTS OF ARTISANAL PROPERTY IN SKILL 
In popular lore, medieval and early modern cities are most renowned for 
having been a refuge for personal liberty in an age of arbitrary feudal power and 
insecurity. "A year and a day" was the customary amount of "city-air" an 
escaped serf needed to gain freedom from a manorial lord. But equally important 
as this negative liberty of the freed serf was the positive liberty of citizenship 
rights to which a surprising number of the population laid claim. Not just elites 
and bourgeois merchants, but numerous artisans as well "possessed" the freedom 
of the city and hence the rights of citizenship--the right to law (civil), the right to 
participate (political), and the right to livelihood (social). This freedom, moreover, 
was a form of property; it was possessed by those who held rights to its claim. 
The hallmark of these urban "freedoms" were their rooting in the property of 
membership.50 How did this property develop and why did so many urban 
working people have relatively broad rights long before their "proper" structural 
cause? 
The answer lies in the place of the guild in the urban political culture.51 In 
a process of struggle lasting almost half a century, guilds battled local elites of 
I merchants and authorities and eventually won both official recognition and notable 
power in local governance. The triumph occurred in 1319 by Royal Charter under 
King Edward 11: all "inhabitants to be admitted [into the freedom] shall be of 
some mistery ..."; anyone seeking to obtain the freedom who did not belong to a 
guild "shall then only be admitted with full assent of the commonality 
a ~ s e m b l e d " . ~ ~  In translation, that meant that to become a citizen one had to 
enter into or "possess" the "freedom" of the town or city. Yet entry to the 
freedom and thus to citizenship could only be achieved through membership in a 
guild (the m i ~ t e r ~ ) . ~ ~  Thus was forged a mighty bond between guild membership 
and citizenship. I t  was not the division of labor or the mode of production that 
shaped artisanal rights and created this political culture. Rather it was the 
political culture of the guild which gave artisans' access to the public sphere of 
citizenship. In order to make sense of this it is necessary to reconstruct the 
practices and institutions of that political culture, its civil rules and codes of 
membership. For therein lay its power. 
In a medieval and early modern town more was required for a skilled 
artisan to ply the trade than knowledge of a technical skill. To practice the "arte 
and mystery" of a craft required guild membership. Only members of a guild 
could legally practice their craft in a town, but guild membership in turn required 
the possession of a crucial kind of property--the property of an apprenticeship.54 
Apprenticeship, of course, is generally thought of as period of training for a skill, 
but the meaning of an apprenticeship was not primarily in its technical training. 
Seven years was the standard time required to serve as an apprentice but a t  the 
end of the service the artisan did not "leave behind" the apprenticeship. Only in 
part did it represent the journeyman's training and investment of time. More 
significantly, the credential of an apprenticeship signified the new "ownership" of 
a set of social and political relations and connections, a guaranteed place in a 
network of attachments, as well as all the rights and obligations consequent to 
those attachments. The apprenticeship now became the artisan's "property1'--a 
permanent credential belonging to the artisan guaranteeing benefits as long as 
these were exercised within the guild. This was not mobile property that attached 
to the individual crafts person.55 The property acquired during an apprenticeship 
was in fact the property of social membership; the exercise of apprenticeship rights 
was thus predicated on the practice and maintenance of institutionalized social 
relations. 
The key to this relational conception of property is in the original English 
word for skill. The word is mistery, as in the "arte and mistery of weaving." One 
reason skill was a mistery was because knowledge of a craft was viewed as a 
specialized and symbolic secret that should take time and trust to acquire.56 But 
mistery had another meaning and use that prevailed over the first: a misterv was 
also the medieval word for the craft guild itself, the social body, the fellowship, the 
corporate and instituted group.57 Unlike the word skill which is singular and 
individual, misterv was simultaneously individual and corporate. To possess the 
mister? was to simultaneously "possess" knowledge and By 
contrast, in modern social science and economics, skill is defined as "human 
capital," a technical capacity which provides economic power to an individual. But 
in the political culture of the guild an "unskilled" worker was not defined as such 
hrough a w' because he or she was technically incompetent. Indeed, t ide arrav of 
illegal practices manv "unskilled" workers, in fact, were technically trained, The 
definition of an "unskilled","dishonorablel', and "illegal" worker was one who 
worked without the property of an apprenticeship, that is, who worked without a 
misterv, without relational obligations, without the bounds and the bonds of 
association, and without the political culture of membership. The attachments of 
membership, not training or ability alone, conferred legality and the property of 
. 
The property of apprenticeship and skill was therefore a form of cultural 
capital. I t  was a social and cultural "mistery," not a technical or individual 
attribute. At the end of the service, the crafts-person (now a journeyman) was 
taken through a public ceremony in which he or she swore by oath to follow the 
gruld's rules and obligations.60 With that oath the artisan was entitled and 
obligated to the connections and the powers embodied in the property of 
apprenticeship. This included citizenship, livelihood, employment, mutual aid, 
religious life, social organizations--indeed an entire cradle to grave culture, as well 
as the mandate to participate in public ceremonial processions and "mistery plays" 
which affirmed the political identity of membership.61 
Relationalitv thus turned out to be the key to the city; apprenticeship was 
the medium. But it is also crucial to  recognize that the relationality of the guild's 
political culture did not conform to the ideal-typical one of a "gemeinschaft" 
community. Rather, the purpose of the property of membership was precisely to 
provide the foundations for real independence and liberties.62 The prominent 
emphasis among artisans on independence and autonomy suggests the importance 
of distinguishing the normative from the institutional conception of relationality. 
The right to the freedom of practicing one's skill, as well as that of citizenship, 
achieved the goal of individual empowerment. But this empowerment only had 
viability when rooted in the institutional foundations of attachments and 
membership. Only the possession of membership allowed for individual 
empowerment and the meaningful exercise of rights. Clearly the practices of 
relationality were matched by those of exclusion, thus preventing citizenship rights 
from being automatically conferred upon all people. But this is the important 
point: among "the people" those included and excluded (including gender exclusion) 
were based less on class divisions or land ownership than on the political 
contingencies and powers of membership. 
V. RURAL-INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROPERTY, AND SKILL 
On the face of it, these urban practices would seem to have little to do with 
rural-industrial labor markets and livelihoods. After all, it was precisely to avoid 
this political culture of skill and property that merchants capitalists sought out the 
rural countryside. But to accept this proposition is to assume exactly that which 
economic sociology urges us to question--namely the very possibility that economic 
relations and labor markets can ever operate outside of any cultural and 
institutional environment. English rural-industrial labor markets, contrary to this 
assumption, most assuredly did exist outside of any institutional framework. 
In fact, through different means rural-industrial communities existed within a 
political culture functionally parallel to  that of the urban guilds. I have considered 
the first two institutional foundations e l ~ e w h e r e . ~ ~  In this final section I will 
concentrate on the third--the rural-industrial possession of property in membership 
on which an essential part of their political culture was grounded. 
We have seen that the regulative labor power of guild workers in large part 
was dependent upon the networks of association among members themselves. 
What this presupposed, however, and what the enforcement of sanctions required, 
was the continuity of an independent and self-disciplined community. 
Independent, because the community had to be free from potentially 
countervailing elite sanctions and rules. And self-disciplined, because workers 
chose the public relations of the laboring community over private interests 
whether through apprenticeship, "fair" and "just" wage levels, or participation in 
formal and informal mutual social security associations. Recall that the right to 
acquire skill--and so to have the "attributes" necessary for employment--was the 
result of an individual's inclusion and rootedness within the community that 
controlled the right to be trained. A skilled community, therefore was a 
particular kind of community. I t  was one that conferred independence upon the 
working person--we can think of it as a "willed community" rather than a 
"traditional communityv--and it certainly did not preclude, but negotiated with, 
commodity and labor markets.64 The independence of the willed community was 
not based on the freedom of the individual labor contract, but on the freedom 
gained by the exercise of rights and expectations, of public and relational 
protection against private economic power. Through the individual's alliance with 
a set of social and public relationships, skill and independence became rights of 
membership. The network or community of the skilled was the precondition for 
restrictive labor market practices. 
If rural-industrial workers were also able to exercise such practices, it must 
be explained by the political and institutional relationships of their communities. 
But we must be careful not to make the mistake of looking for evidence of "proto- 
bureaucracies." The Webbs' approach suffered from an excessive formalism; as 
long as they were looking for something which resembled modern unions, they 
surely could not find it in rural-industrial countryside. If we turn their arguments 
inside out, however, a different proposition can be considered. Regulative power 
was not the cause, but the result, of workers' association. This allows us to 
consider textile communities from a different perspective. I t  was not formal trade 
unionism that created workers' association, but the reverse: by maintaining 
relationality over time and space, English rural clothworkers were able to organize 
without formal guilds. As in the case of urban skilled artisans, this regulative 
solidarity was contingent upon community institutions and practices of association 
which promoted the power of sanction and the conferring of collective rights. Like 
urban skilled artisans, rural-industrial textile workers negotiated with market 
forces through cohesive political association. Association preceded organization; 
indeed, it was its foundation. Yet a question still remains. Association required 
the continuity of a settled population, and such continuity cannot be taken for 
granted in the face of the potentially corrosive impact of the market. It is not 
enough to explain association by relying on gemeinschaft notions of "habit", or to 
claim that association was a "natural ...p art of the life of the community".65 The 
capacity for association or community cannot be invoked or assumed; it must be 
explained. 66 
To understand the capacity for association, it is the relational 
"infrastructure" of rural-industrial life that must be the subject of analysis.67 
English textile communities differed from agricultural communities in the 
conditions and rules in their communities. Along two axes English rural textile 
communities resembled urban communities: 1) in the degree of spatial and political 
independence from authority; and 2) in the degree of self-regulated co-operation 
among each other. Along the first axis, rural industrial communities had both a 
relatively less powerful, smaller, and more diffused manorial presence as well as 
an employer class which did not live locally. These communities, therefore, 
enjoyed greater collective independence than did agrarian communities. And along 
the second axis, textile communities had more tightly regulated kin relationships. 
These two interrelated characteristics combined tc create the sociological hybrid of 
self-regulating independent communities which linked independence not to freedom 
from the public sphere but ta public participation, self-rule, and membership rules 
binding people to each other. 
Among the several factors that supported rural-industrial life was the 
ownership of a kind of property with which we should now be familiar--the 
property of skill. By making the possession of skill a prerequisite for fair 
employment, rural-industrial workers were able, in large part, to control the right 
to enter the labor market through the careful distribution of skill. The acquisition 
of skill, however, was not simply available for the taking. Apprenticeship was still 
the principal means by which this right was both conferred and sustained. Adam 
Smith understood well the importance of apprenticeship when in 1776 he railed 
against it as a restraint upon competition among the labor force, and because it 
led to workers' combinations which "reducing the whole manufacture into a sort of 
slavery to themselves" raised the price of their labor "much above what is due to 
the nature of their work."68 Just as with urban apprenticeship, rural 
apprenticeship required of the young person a mandatory seven years of 
association with an adult worker. I t  was intended to prevent people from acting 
out of individual interest and to check the balance of employer demand over 
worker supply by restricting the numbers of available working people. Preventing 
gluts of labor by controlling entry was only one of the benefits of apprenticeship. 
Through apprenticeship the customs of the trade were passed on and preserved, 
and the practice became part of the "school of public life" in which rights and 
obligations were taught and given renewed life.69 Those who violated these 
became "unskilled" and "unfair" workers. Skilled working people were not skilled 
because they had been apprenticed; they were apprenticed only because they were 
already "skilled", which is to say, participants in a network of social relations that 
practiced obligation and exclusion. 
Apprenticeship was not only a right of participation in the collectivity; it 
was also in no uncertain terms conceived of as a property right. Where Smith 
viewed apprenticeship as a violation of the "most sacred and inviolable" property 
which every man had in his own labor, skilled workers viewed the right that a 
formal or informal apprenticeship conferred upon them as the true kind of 
property--the kind defined by the social relations and the institutional association 
of which they were a part.7o Thus, one weaver claimed in defense of the practice: 
"The weaver's qualifications may be considered as his property and support. It is 
as real property to him as buildings and land -are to others. Like them his 
qualification cost time, application and money" ... as well as by "the care and 
purchase of their parents and friends".71 This property right, moreover, was 
sanctioned by the state. English rural-industrial workers were wi excluded from 
regulative policies; the 1563 Statute of Artificers made apprenticeship a national 
legal right throughout town and country. But--and this is crucial--the state was 
only codifying an existing practice and institution which long predated and in fact 
informed the Act of 5 Elizabeth. Thus, while it was an essential by-law of all 
guild and chartered companies, apprenticeship was no less deeply embedded in the 
strictly regulated networks and by-laws of the rural-industrial countryside and the 
textile villages where it was a long-established custom. Accordingly, when 
defending the putatively inviolate customary status of'the threatened law in 1814, 
craftspeople would frequently cite the legal definition of custom in claiming that 
apprenticeship had been a right of working people "from time, to the contrary 
whereof the memory of man runneth not. 1972 
The right to become skilled by means of an apprenticeship was thus a right 
given only to those already included in associated networks. In cities, the guilds 
determined who was to be included. But in the absence of formal urban guilds, 
the question must arise as to what could play the same role of defining who was to 
be included and who was to be excluded from the right to apprenticeship? 
The rural-industrial family was the guild of the countryside. In the 1970s 
and 80s, building on the pathbreaking work of earlier scholars such as Ivy 
Pinchbeck and Alice Clark, scholars developed an influential "household 
economics" theory to address the relationship between the family and early 
capitalist development.73 The household economics approach begins from a set of 
Marxist assumptions about the logic of capitalist production. The chief one 
concerns the transmutation of potentially resistant workers into "factors of 
production." Applied to proto industry, this assumption points to the 
commodification of the family unit by the process of capitalization in the 
countryside. Most important to this claim is the assumption of the propertyless 
condition of these family units. Without ownership of production it is assumed 
that the family had no resources to resist total exploitation. In contrast to the 
militancy of an organized urban artisanry, rural industrial families are thus 
portrayed principally as powerless victims to the invincible logic of accumulation. 
But there is a different angle'of vision from which to view the relationship 
between the rural-industrial family and textile production for a waged labor 
market. This perspective would begin with the "logic" of the family itself. 
Rural cloth-workers were the progenies of earlier peasant families who 
tenaciously practiced partible inheritance in the pastoral regions of England. 
Dividing the land among heirs ensured generational bonding over time and space 
and so institutionalized in inheritance patterns the rights and obligations of social 
security and family cohesion. When early modern rural families confronted the 
new conditions of rural-industrial production and the potential threats of an open 
labor market, this "logic" of partibility was not superseded by the logic of 
accumulation. Instead, the pastoral cum-rural-industrial family flexibly 
transformed the rights that land inheritance guaranteed to a new form of 
inheritance adapted to the new conditions: it converted the r i ~ h t s  of partible 
inheritance into the rights of the inheritance of skill, This conversion explains the 
rural-industrial family's jealous control over 'its power to confer apprenticeship: as 
long as children were dependent upon the acquisition of apprenticeship to enter on 
fair terms the associated laboring collectivity, they were equally bound to their 
families. The practice of transmitting and distributing skills among children 
served, like the practice of partible inheritance, as a hransgenerational trust. 
Because it established the boundaries of social inclusion, membership in a 
family was the prerequisite for apprenticeship. In a process comparable to guilds, 
(and guilds were originally nothing more than households), clothworking families 
regulated and distributed apprenticeships.'14 It all looked deceptively simple and 
natural: apprenticeships were usually carried out in the home where both father 
and mother instructed their children, in a neighbor's or relative's home, or even in 
a small workshop.75 In rural-industrial regions, family continuity in the trade 
was the rule. Parentally-trained children worked in the family home until they 
either inherited it or set up their own when they married; their parents were 
likely to help them purchase their own looms. Weaving, for example, was always 
taught to children by a parent or sibling: 
My mother taught me (while too young to weave) to earn my bread 
carding and spinning cotton, winding linen or cotton weft for my 
father and elder brothers a t  the loom, until I becaw of sufficient age 
and strength for my father to put me into a loom. 
What appears simple, however, was, in fact, a matter of strict regulation 
and sanction: through its control of apprenticeship, the family was the critical link 
which both protected the community as a whole from the dangers of unskilled 
individual labor contracts (an open labor market) and protected the individual 
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from the social exclusion resulting from working without an apprenticeship. With 
membership in the associated laboring community as the precondition of individual 
and collective independence, and with apprenticeship the chief symbol of that 
membership, the family's control over apprenticeship established the family as the 
heart of the regulative process. Threatened with the potentially corrosive impact 
of a wage labor market, apprenticeship became the glue of the rural-industrial 
family's cohesion. The right to apprenticeship, like the right to land, was an 
institutional relationship. And like all institutional relationships with any binding 
power, it was composed of a right and an obligation: apprenticeship conferred the 
right to full membership in the laboring community while i t  simultaneously 
obliged the child to the family. This generational bonding over time was as 
essential for the parents as for the young. I t  ensured support for parents when 
their old age significantly reduced their earning power.77 
But rights and obligations need sanctions to work'effectively. Like the 
ownership of land, the "ownership" of the "property" of apprenticeship was an 
entitlement that was conditional upon fulfilling family and community obligations. 
Because the right to the property of industrial skill required familial bonding, the 
sanction and the expectation of apprenticeship maintained familial cohesion and 
stability. One could not go out and simply buy an apprenticeship; apprenticeships 
were available only to those already within the family system. As a social right, it 
could only be acquired through the networks of inheritance and familial 
transmission. Apprenticeship was thus a thoroughly relational idiom. It  was both 
acquired in the first place through the relationships, the rights, and the duties of 
family membership; and it was only useful as an institutional relationship, to 
entitle the owner to the right of inclusion in the working community. 
If the loss of land threatened to loosen parental control over children,'18 the 
transmission of skill came to substitute for land with an equally iron-like grip and 
maintained the geographical stability of rural-industrial villages.'l9 Unlike 
children in agricultural regions, children of rural-industrial families did not 
normally leave home for service in another household.80 Instead they stayed a t  
home to serve their apprenticeship. And when rural-industrial children did leave 
home after apprenticeship to set up their own households, they did not go far. 
Even among those who moved, it was rarely more than fifteen miles from the 
place of birth. Marriage partners were usually from the immediate area and 
families entrenched themselves by spreading out in their regions so that networks 
of families, kin, and kindred could absorb and redistribute resources. What 
mobility did take place, moreover, was orchestrated through networks or kin, 
former workers, or neighbors, and "extended" families of lodgers, neighbors, and 
kin were so common in these households that they have been described as "eating 
up labour". 
Family practices had a direct impact on social relations in the community a t  
large producing a denser network of kinship ties-- hence community-wide rights 
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and obligations--than in the non- textile regions.83 The density of actual blood 
kinship relations varied across rural communities and there was a significantly 
higher amount of kinship connection among people in the rural-industrial 
community a t  large. This is not difficult to explain: because they produced more 
children, and because these children tended to stay within their immediate place of 
birth, it is not surprising that over time rural-industrial communities would have 
denser kinship networks. Denser kinship relationships among people promoted 
stronger social sanctions and interdependent expectations of rights and obligations 
than among non-blood related neighbors. They reinforced the distribution of skills, 
regulated the level of acceptable wages, and countered the pull of hunger by 
providing alternative sources of livelihood to those of "illegal" wages. The 
consequences were likely to be swift and direct for those who violated kinship 
pressures, most likely the severing of the social relations on which individual 
survival was based. But the normal sanctions of kinship ties more than likely 
preempted many violations even before they happened. 
While clothworking families thus imposed their own cohesive practices 
against the corrosive impact of the labor market, these practices were not, 
however, geared towards familial isolation from the working community a t  large. 
Woven into the fibers of intra-familial relationships, apprenticeship throughout the 
wider community was equally "woven into the fabric of domestic industry" in all of 
the rural-industrial regions.84 Familial practices of apprenticeship set the 
standard (if not always the reality) for a closed labor market in the older textile 
regions of the West Country, East Anglia, the West Riding but also in 
Lancashire's newest cotton regions where apprenticeship was formally excluded 
from Eliz 5. Community control over apprenticeship was usually much stronger 
than that of formal law and a fully competitive labor market was hard pressed to 
"take off' even in the nation's number one growth industry of cotton. 
Apprenticeship was the chief emblem of participatory rights in the labor 
community. It denoted initiation in and commitment to the common ethics and 
obligations of that community, and it conferred the right to independence 
characteristic of skilled labor. 
Family practices were also at the heart of self-regulation in work. The 
family basis of labor supported a structure of production that depended upon 
coordination, cooperation, and mutual interdependence. Because rural textile 
production operated on a domestic basis, it is often thought to have been a non- 
disciplined, almost idiosyncratic activity that took place in spurts. But even when 
compared to the more notorious aspects of early factory discipline, the degree of 
anomie among rural-industrial working people has been greatly exaggerated. 85 
Mutual interdependence was necessary to rural-industrial production, and the 
familial and community bases of production ensured the enforcement of this 
interdependency. Mutual interdependence in work relations began in the family 
itself. As a unit of labor, the family was observed to have been like a disciplined 
machine made up of interconnected parts. This was so pronounced in the domestic 
textile industry that in the Napoleonic wars, the government was reluctant to 
conscript family members out of concern that the disruption to family units of 
production would be of greater damage to the productive capacity of the nation 
than the military benefits.86 Women and children did not de-skill the workforce. 
On the contrary, the interdependency of the working unit reinforced the skilled 
practices of association. 
Coordination and cooperation not only characterized a single producing 
family but also integrated the multiple family units in the rural-industrial 
community. The division of labor could be quite elaborate within rural-industrial 
chains of producing units; transforming the pace of work at  one of the junctions 
created a ripple effect throughout the "controlled chain of production. it87 
Employers tried to take advantage of this by speeding production demands of. 
individual units, but were faced with a deeper coordination among the laboring 
community. The subcontracting among workers enforced a similar coordination. 
That weavers had to rely on numerous spinners for their yarn, although often 
creating tensions, also supported coordination. Family cohesion and the structure 
of production were thus complementary processes. 
The direct link between family practices and the regulation of the labor 
supply of the larger community was forged through the currency of a political 
culture of membership. The rightful and "fair" membership in the networks of 
textile working families which apprenticeship demanded was an induction into the 
social experience of the To violate these values in favor of 
individual gain was in these terms an absolute loss; to be deprived of the 
asspcoatopm was a total deprivation. That dishonor and enforced isolation befell 
one who took on work as an "illegal", who accepted lower than customary wages 
under the temptation of unemployment, who refused to support a strike or to give 
mutual assistance to a fellow worker may well have been experienced as group 
tyranny. But that cooperation in the ethics of regulative solidarity was identified 
by contemporaries as a right and a freedom is not in doubt. 
The picture of rural-industry my argument offers is as different from the 
picture presented in the proto-industrialization model as my picture of community 
independence is from the gemeinschaft models of traditional communities. 
Theories of proto-industrialization substitute merchant capitalist wealth for landed 
wealth as the labor market mechanism shaping society, and argue that because 
they lived beyond the bounds of urban regulated guilds, rural producers were 
unorganized and overpopulated and thus defenseless victims of the market forces 
of supply and demand. If the proto-industrialization theory is correct, the rural- 
industrial community should have been utterly corroded by the capitalization of 
the countryside. But the wage-labor market was itself confronted by the strength 
of institutional relationality and social networks. The bundle of rights and 
obligations embodied in apprenticeship--the relationality bound up in the right to 
the property of skill--were a formidable force against any inherent logic of capital 
production. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen many social practices in action; but can we identify a logic to 
them? In many ways they appear to be a jumble of incompatible ideas. The 
notion that individual freedom was rooted in social and institutional relationships 
is incompatible with foundational ideas which locate freedom in the private realm 
of an individual's right to freedom from the tyranny of the public sphere--the 
group, the despot, the church, or the community. The "customs of the trade" were 
surely part of the lexicon of the "traditional craftsman", and so seem oddly cloaked 
in the modern language of liberty, freedom, and rights. Apprenticeship is another 
"traditional" idea that may fit with pre-industrial society before the age of new 
model unionism,89 but which seems incompatibly linked with the idea of property 
right. Wage demands, on the other hand, are surely modern demands that seem 
out of place with the more traditional ideas of solidarity (it was E.P. Thompson 
who spoke of the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century as one 
reflected in the transition in demands from the "bread nexus" to the "wage 
nexus").90 And finally the principle of freedom in associations seems equally odd: 
traditional (urban) guilds are identified with mutual associations, but the 
redistribution of wages and the inter-local alliances of these rural-industrial textile 
workers seem distinctly like the modern "citizen wage" of the welfare state. We 
may have identified the connections among skill, property, and rights but have we 
unraveled their meaning? 
The relationship among these activities strongly suggests that livelihoods 
did not depend on the reproduction or even the ownership of productive processes; 
rather, livelihood was constituted through the rules of social networks and their 
political cultures. The property of membership and the rights it endowed reflected 
the inseparable connection between individual freedom and participatory 
embeddedness within the ties of social relations. Freedom and independence--both 
of which were highly valued and articulated goals of Chartists--were thus not 
conceived as "freedom from" the community, the family, the state, or the law. On 
the contrary, freedom, independence, even property itself, was explicitly linked to 
the relationship of the individual to the variety of ways that institutional 
relationships were expressed. 
Nineteenth-century workers who were to fill the rank and file of the 
Chartist movement brought with them this political culture of property, rights, 
and membership--one a t  odds with the ideas of liberal, Marxist, and 
communitarian theories which have long dominated theories of class formation. In 
their political culture, to maintain skill was to maintain the associated and 
regulative character of the working community, to maintain its capacity for 
association. The aim was to prevent the metaphorical separation of each person's 
public associations--of family, of kin, of community, of the public--from the 
individual person's private wage contract. For if the associated character of skill 
preserved independence, the reverse was also true: detachment led to free agency, 
competition, and labor glutting through "deskillingN--in short, to collective 
discontinuity. The degree to which textile workers saw wage levels as a means of 
corporate mutuality is a lucid example of the simultaneity of "modern" waged 
labor relations and "traditional" corporate solidarity. Wage demands are viewed 
by many sociologists as "reformist" demands indicating an acceptance of modern 
capitalism, the modern market and its ancillary social attributes--primarily that of 
self-interest. "Traditional" behavior, on the other hand, is supposed to be 
"qualitative"; traditional 'workers allegedly focus on non-monetary forms of moral 
solidarity. Neither of these pre~uppositions can account for the relationship 
between a waged labor market and the co-operative use of wages on the part of 
the workers. The explanation is simple: wage demands in the interest of 
relationality reflected the flexible readjustment of a collective identity based on 
association to the reality of waged labor. A waged labor market did not fragment 
and corrode the community of producers into abstract free agents divested of their 
sociality; nor did that community only "look backward" to a non-market and non- 
waged system of labor relations. In a world where production was primarily one 
of wage labor, association required harnessing the currency of the cash-nexus. 
Wage levels, to be sure, were central issues, but in a non-utitilarian context they 
were "citizen wages. " 
One of the results of this approach is thus a highly revised conception of 
property. The classical paradigm considers property to be a matter of ownership 
derived from autonomous labor; as such i t i s  conceived in terms of a relationship 
between individual persons and things, whether the thing is land or the fruits of 
labor. Conversely, the absence of material property is correlated with 
proletarianization and powerlessness. But a deeper exploration into the 
Chartists'political culture reveals that for them property was not a "thing." 
- Rather a property (propriety one's own relations) was a network of relationships 
among persons, and between persons, institutions, and the larger public sphere. It 
was not property that caused political rights; it was the political culture of 
membership that produced property, and the rights of property were expressed 
through the cultural capital of membership rights. Property could take the form of 
land, the house, or most importantly, of skill. But regardless of its form, its 
meaning was relational. The rights of property in effect only existed within the 
context of institutional relationships and the political culture of which they were a 
part. Beginning in the seventeenth century, this relational concept of property 
was forced to compete with a newly developed idea of liberty based solely on the 
individual rights of property produced from autonomous labor. Since then these 
Lockean ideas of natural rights have dominated the social history of politics.91 
But not only did the former public conception of rights and freedom prove 
remarkably robust in its competition with Locke's ideas; arguably, it was more 
significant in shaping modern popular conceptions of and claims to political rights. 
Finally, I want to argue that this study suggests a radical amendment to a 
common thread underlying recent historiographical and sociological moves to 
abandon economic relations and instead to concentrate principally on culture, 
discourse, and ideology. These revisions have been invaluable. Paradoxically 
however, they have often had the unintended consequence of reinforcing (by 
neglect) the "economism" of social history. Stressing culture or even p~litics as 
separate spheres from the economy leaves intact the fiction that markets are self- 
regulating, autonomous systems. It locates labor and property and material life on 
one side, and cultural and political concerns on the other. But the challenge to the 
"economistic fallacy" must be two-fold: it must not onlyreject the idea that the 
state (or culture, or ideas) are driven by the logic of the economy. More 
fundamentally, it must challenge the idea that there can exist a "logic" of the 
economy that is not itself institutionally and culturally ~ o n s t i t u t e d . ~ ~  
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